A YACHT UNDER OBSERVATION in the River Mersey approach channel in the vicinity of C13 Buoy was reported to the honorary secretary of New Brighton ILB station by Formby Coastguard at 1655 on Saturday, October 23, 1976. It was foreseen that, with the strong south-westerly winds blowing at the time, she might need help.

Half an hour later the honorary secretary was informed by the Coastguard that the yacht had sent up distress flares. Maroons were fired and the ILB crew assembled while a check was made to see if the weather conditions were suitable for the boat to launch.The wind was south west force 7 to 8 gusting to strong gale force 9 in the channel with a moderate sea. The sky was mainly overcast with slight occasional drizzle; visibility was good. It was low water spring tides and the tidal stream was at slack water. The sea conditions in the river and approach channel were considered to be within the boat's operational capability and Atlantic 21 B509 was launched from the beach at the north side of New Brighton Pier at 1740.

As the ILB, commanded by Helmsman Edward 'Bev' Brown, set out at full speed seaward along the approach channel, Formby Coastguard reported that the casualty was thought to be on the sea training wall by C13 Buoy. As the ILB passed C19 Buoy a boat was sighted on the port bow outside the channel on the west side of the training wall and when, at 1755, she arrived at a position close to the training wall between buoys C15 and C13 the Coastguard confirmed that it was this boat, a converted ship's lifeboat, which had fired the distress flares. The boat was under power and appeared to be seeking a way through the training wall; people could be seen on board, aft. The sea in the channel under the lee of the wall was slight to moderate, and slight at the casualty which was getting protection from Great Burbo Bank.

Being unable to contact or close the casualty, Helmsman Brown told the Coastguard that he would go back to the south end of the training wall by C29 Buoy and try to rendezvous by crossing Brazil Bank and edging along the west side of Great Burbo Bank. The training wall was rounded at 1805 as light was failing.

It was noticed that the tide was beginning to flood and Helmsman Brown asked the Coastguard for a weather report. He was told that the weather was deteriorating and frequent gusts of force 9, still from the south west, were being experienced at Mersey Bar.

Asked by Formby Coastguard if he thought the conditions suitable for theILB, Helmsman Brown replied that he was all right at the moment but, with the rising tide and strong winds, he might not be able to reach the casualty. He requested helicopter support and that Hoylake lifeboat be placed on standby.

On crossing Brazil Bank the ILB touched bottom two or three times and started to encounter moderate surf.

Course was set to pass along the western edge of Great Burbo Bank, but progress was very slow due to the shallow water and surf. After about an hour, at 1912, the Coastguard reported that a helicopter would be over the area in 30 minutes.

At 1925, when just west of the mid part of Great Burbo Bank, a red flare was sighted close to the water four points on the starboard bow at a distance of about two miles; it was from the last known position of the casualty.

The ILB reported back to the Coastguard and put up a white parachute illuminating flare, but nothing was sighted.

It was now dark and waves about six feet high were running in from the north west. The ILB continued to make ground northwards along the edge of the bank in an effort to close the casualty. The Coastguard told the crew that the Bar pilot cutter was coming down channel to take up station by the training wall opposite the casualty, and Hoylake lifeboat was crossing the sands to launch. A message relayed from the honorary secretary advised the helmsman to proceed with caution and not to try to take the boat in tow.

The sea state continued to get worse and the helmsman was experiencing difficulty in keeping the ILB's head to sea. At 1930 the waves were thought to have been about 10 feet high. It was at this time that the Coastguard relayed from the pilot cutter a report that the casualty was aground and people were in the water. Helmsman Brown continued to make slow progress to the north to cross the north-west corner of the bank. At about 1940 a helicopter was seen to pass to the south and fly northwards up the line of the training wall.

The ILB was asked by the Coastguard to direct the helicopter on to the casualty but was unable to do so because she was too far away to sight the boat; perhaps the pilot cutter could provide the direction? Helmsman Brown said that he would do his best to remain in the area while the helicopter was searching, as requested by the Coastguard, but was being forced northwards in order to keep the boat head to weather; the sea state had become so bad that he was anxious not to allow the boat's head to pay off.

At 1955 the Coastguard requested the ILB to shift radio frequency from Channel 0 to 16 and told her that Hoylake lifeboat was launching.

As the ILB headed towards the north end of the training wall into deeperwater the seas increased. She continued into the sea and eventually entered the main channel in the vicinity of Q3 Buoy at about 2100. Some ten minutes later when passing Qll Buoy she heard that the crew of the converted lifeboat, Annalivia, had been lifted from the casualty by the helicopter and the ILB should return to station.

The return to station was made at full speed without incident in decreasing wind that had veered to the north west.

The ILB arrived off the beach at New Brighton at 2140 and was rehoused and made ready for service by 2150.

The survivors were landed from the helicopter at Speke Airport.

For this service the thanks of the Institution inscribed on vellum were accorded to Helmsman Edward Beverley Brown and vellum service certificates were presented to Crew Members Robert Robertson and Joseph Pringle..