Eastern Division 141 hour service in severe gale A MESSAGE FROM THE YACHT Coronade to the Sunk Pilot Cutter, saying that a red flare had been sighted southward, in the direction of the Long Sand, was intercepted by Walton Coastguard at 1621 on Sunday, September 14, 1975. Sightings followed from the radio ship Mi Amiga in position 5r42.5'N,01°35'E, and at 1628 the deputy launching authority of Walton and Frinton station was requested to launch the lifeboat. The maroons were fired at 1630 and at 1642 the 46' 9" Watson lifeboat Edian Courtauld slipped her moorings off Walton Pier and set out on a southeasterly course.

The weather was overcast with rain, and the wind was north north east, force 7. High water Harwich was predicted at 1948.

HM Coastguard diverted the Mansion RAF helicopter from another casualty to confirm the yacht's position, and at 1655 it was clarified that Coronade, to the east of the radio ship, was firing flares to attract attention to a second yacht in distress some 1$ miles to the north of Mi Amiga. The DLA and the Coastguard agreed that the lifeboat should be directed to the radio ship's position to assess the casualty's actual position in relation to Long Sand.

By 1719 the lifeboat had reached Wallet No. 2 Buoy and, with all shelter from the land now lost, was rolling heavily in a rough beam sea. Coxswain Frank Bloom had decided that despite the severity of the weather he would go directly across the top of Gunfleet Sand and thence to the westward side of Long Sand. Crossing Gunfleet Sand in confused breaking seas, he instructed Crew Members Jack Barrett, Brian Oxley and Owen Bloom to keep lookout on the foredeck; the lifeboat reached Black Deep No. 2 Buoy at 1810.

It was getting dark, but helped by directions from the helicopter overhead, lights from the casualty were soon seen two miles eastward; taking over the helm from Second Coxswain Dennis Finch, Coxswain Bloom ordered the lookouts to clear the foredeck and reduced speedto three-quarter throttle before attempting to cross Long Sand on an easterly course; he was well aware of the risk of grounding, for although it was now high water the area was a mass of white water with heavy 12' waves breaking irregularly, but with deteriorating weather he decided that time was short if the crew were to be taken off the yacht.

When half a mile east of Black Deep No. 2 Buoy the lifeboat took a heavy roll to port, and through the wheelhouse skylight Coxswain Bloom saw a secondary wave rising above the boat; shouting a warning to all crew, he put the port engine half ahead and swung the wheel hard to starboard as the lifeboat rolled to starboard under the crest of the secondary wave. The three lookouts had moved aft and were abreast the starboard wheelhouse door as the lifeboat rolled to an estimated 70° to starboard. Motor Mechanic Bryan Ward, in his position to starboard of the coxswain, managed to brace himself against the door sill, taking the combined weights of the coxswain and second coxswain on his back as water filled the wheelhouse through the lee door and after wheelhouse opening.

For a few seconds the boat was completely covered as the wave broke over her and Jack Barrett and the two younger crew members on the lee rail were submerged in heavy water.

Momentarily Coxswain Bloom felt that a capsize was inevitable, " . . . as it went completely dark . . .', but the boat swung downwind as intended and drained rapidly. No crew members had suffered more than bruising as they were thrown to starboard and, in an effort to avert a similar situation, Coxswain Bloom ordered Bowman Robert Kemp and Jack Barrett to stream the drogue to 8 fathoms; this was no easy task in the violently moving boat, but was safely achieved. Course was then altered southeastward to run on a quartering sea.

The weather remained overcast with heavy rain squalls and the wind had increased to north east by north force 9, with heavy seas accentuated by the beginning of the north-north-east ebb tide. Visibility varied, reducing to one mile in squalls.

Once clear of the heavy surf area the drogue was recovered and the lifeboat altered course northward, coming up on the casualty at 1852. The 30' yacht, Tsunami, was lying to anchor, flying a flag distress signal, under bare spars.

The heavy seas were causing her to veer excessively but the lifeboat was taken to within hailing distance to ascertain that the crew would leave the yacht: the answer received was that they would do so.

Placing all fenders on the starboard side, Coxswain Bloom took the lifeboat upwind until abreast of the yacht at a distance of some 40 feet and met the yacht as she veered towards him. The crew were spaced along the lifeboat's side deck and although two of the yacht's crew were helped across without serious difficulty, the third man had to be grabbed quickly and hauled aboard as a sea lifted the lifeboat away from the yacht in a violent movement.

As Coxswain Bloom manoeuvred to re-position the lifeboat to take off the two remaining men, one of those already on board told him that the owner andone other would not leave the yacht. The coxswain quickly decided that the only course of action was to try to tow the yacht into deeper open water before the full ebb tide made conditions untenable.

The second approach was made in a similar manner and the end of a 1 " nylon towline passed from the bow to the yacht owner, being cleared along the lifeboat's side by all available crew members until, at 20 fathoms, it was made fast aft and secured around the yacht's mast, backed up to a cleat. The yacht's anchor cable was then cut.

Towing began towards North Knock Buoy. Coxswain Bloom's first intention, having been told again that the owner was determined to remain on board, was to attempt the 25-mile downwind passage to Ramsgate. However, one of the yacht's crew told him that Tsunami's rudder was jammed hard a'starboard and that the keel had apparently fractured upon grounding earlier; some water was reported to be entering the hull. With the yacht in that condition Coxswain Bloom rightly considered that a long downwind tow was too hazardous; there was a real danger of broaching, and if the yacht lost her keel and capsized it might be impossible to rescue the two yachtsmen should they be in the cabin.

At 1900, therefore, Coxswain Bloom turned lifeboat and tow on to a northerly course to clear Long Sand Head, maintaining the wind on the bow for as long as possible; the tow was lengthened to 60 fathoms and the owner and his crew member battened themselves into the yacht's cabin to man the pump.

At 2112 Long Sand Head Buoy was abeam and course eased to westward.

At 2341, abeam of Sunk Lightvessel, course was again altered to port, with the tow passing Cork Spit Buoy at 0142 and Rolling Ground Buoy at 0210.

From this point an increasing lee was afforded, although the shallow water effect still caused continual rolling. The helm was shared by the more experienced crew members during the homeward tow, which required continuous observation of the yacht and close attention to the towline. Tsunami was towed up the Walton River and secured on a mooring at 0400; the return tow had been made at a speed of just over 2 knots.

All five members of the yacht's crew were taken ashore and returned home in transport arranged by Coxswain Bloom.

At 0425 Edian Courtauld left the river and returned to her moorings; she was reported refuelled and ready for service at 0710.

For this service the silver medal for gallantry was awarded to Coxswain Frank Bloom. The thanks of the Institution inscribed on vellum were accorded to Second Coxswain Dennis Finch, Motor Mechanic Bryan Ward, Bowman Robert Kemp, Assistant Mechanic Keith Richardson and Crew Members Jack Barrett, Brian Oxley and Owen Bloom.

South Eastern Division Hurricane in Straits of Dover DOVER STRAIT COASTGUARD received a Mayday call at 2204 on Monday, December 1, 1975, from the 1,199-ton phosphate loaded Cypriot coaster Primrose indicating loss of steering gear in a position some 3 miles east of Dover breakwater and that tug assistance was required immediately.

At 2205 Dover Strait Coastguard informed Dover Port Control that a tug was required forthwith for the stricken coaster, and in reply was advised that the tug was not considered suitable in the weather conditions prevailing. So the Coastguard informed the honorary secretary of Dover lifeboat station and it was agreed that the lifeboat would stand by to launch if required. Her crew were already assembled and waiting advice to launch to a ferry adrift in Dover Harbour with an injured person aboard.

At 2208 Townsend ferries Free Enterprise VII and Free Enterprise VIII both indicated a 15-minute ETA at the position of the coaster Primrose and the motor vessel Cornish Wasa reported her position to be some 30 minutes' steaming from that of the casualty. At 2226 North Foreland Radio broadcast the position of Primrose to be 4 miles east of Dover eastern breakwater.

At 2221 Dover honorary secretary was told that no tug assistance for Primrose was available and was asked to launch the Dover lifeboat. Accordingly, at 2237, the 44' Waveney lifeboat Faithful Forester slipped her moorings in the submarine pens and set out to sea.

Weather conditions recorded at Dover Strait Coastguard at the time of launching showed the wind direction to be from 200°T with the force as Beaufort Scale storm force 10 (wind speed 48- 55 knots). Tide was just one hour after high water Dover.

The storm force winds and tide created appalling sea conditions at the eastern entrance to Dover Harbour; an enormous maelstrom of confused sea and spume confronted Faithful Forester as she tried to claw her way seaward through the breakwaters. Before clearing them she was laid over on her beam ends but righted herself and went on under the expert helmsmanship of Coxswain/Mechanic Arthur Liddon.

On clearing the eastern harbour entrance at 2242, Faithful Forester was told by Free Enterprise VIII that the course to steer for Primrose was 086°T and, after verifying this to be correct, the lifeboat accordingly set course 092°M.

Wind speed at this time was recorded by instrument aboard Free Enterprise VII to be 70 knots—Beaufort Scale hurricane force 12. Direction was 190°x. Tide was setting 054°T at 2.5 knots.

At 2245 Primrose gave her position as 5 miles north east of Varne Lightvessel and 5 miles east of Dover breakwater.

At 2257 she reported that jury steering gear had been rigged and that a heading of 190°T was being maintained; she was in fact wind and tide rode and making up to the north east at a speed of 2.4 knots.

Free Enterprise VII reported at 2318 that from radar observation the casualty was 1J miles off the Goodwin Sands and closing. At 2320 Dover lifeboat arrived at the casualty having been guided on to her by the deck and searchlights of Free Enterprise VIII. Faithful Forester had covered the 5 miles from Dover Harbour at an average speed of 7.69 knots despite mountainous quarter seas reliably reported by observers on both ferries to be in excess of 25 feet high. To have reached the casualty so promptly despite such conditions highlights the fine seamanship and dogged perseverance of Coxswain Liddon.

Captain Robinson, master of Free Enterprise VII, said of that night: 'The weather at this time was the worst 1 have experienced in this area in some eighteen years service in the Dover Straits. The wind was jusf west of south and my anemometer was indicating 100 mph in regular gusts and then settling at 70 mph. Had Admiral Sir Francis Beaufort lived 170 years later he would certainly have had second thoughts on his wind scale.

'The seas were mountainous and it was obvious to all that the Dover lifeboat had no chance of navigating visually.' Coxswain Liddon expertly conned the Dover lifeboat into a position some half a cable off the starboard quarter of the coaster, which was shipping heavy seas overall, and stood by, maintaining course and speed equivalent to the drift of the casualty. At 2355 navigation lights sighted indicated that an unidentified craft was fast bearing down on to and on collision course with Primrose.

Free Enterprise VII, acting as on scene commander, broadcast a warning on VHF and ascertained that the craft was Malcolm Miller, approaching at 13 knots under bare poles, and that avoiding action was being taken.

At 0042, Dover Strait Coastguard reported by VHF that the weather front would pass through the casualty area in 30 minutes' time and at about 0049, with a wind speed reading of 100 mph recorded by Free Enterprise VII, the Dover lifeboat was for the second time on this service laid on to her beam ends by a combination of sea and wind pressure; it was about half a minute before the wind slackened and Faithful Forester righted herself; she then resumed station off the casualty. During this occurrence Free Enterprise VII, keeping careful watch on the lifeboat, realised something was amiss and checked by VHF radio that all was well.

Meanwhile a Dutch tug reported by VHF that she had sailed from Zeebrugge and gave her approximate ETA as 0930.

The tide was now slack and as thewind had veered to west and diminished in force to 60 knots—still hurricane force 12 though—Coxswain Liddon suggested to the master of Primrose that he should steer 270°T with a view to making some westing and gaining a lee from the land. By 0317 it was obvious that the coxswain's advice, which had been followed, was sound as the coaster had closed to just under six miles from Dover breakwater.

When some two miles off Dover Harbour eastern arm Primrose requested a pilot to take her into harbour. At 0346, however, Free Enterprise VIII relayed a reply to the effect that weather conditions were too severe for the pilot vessel to put out, so Faithful Forester offered to lead Primrose into the anchorage. Thus at 0350 Dover lifeboat took station ahead of the coaster, and by passing alterations of course and speed and also details of the tidal conditions, at 0412 safely piloted Primrose into Dover Harbour whence no other craft had dared to venture all night.

Once Primrose had anchored, Faithful Forester returned to her berth in the pens where she was again made ready for sea and placed on station at 0518.

In the final paragraph of his report Captain Robinson wrote: 'The whole incident from start to finish must be the finest piece of seamanship I have ever seen with such limited facilities in the worst possible conditions and I salute this small band of dedicated lifeboatmen who risked life and limb for some eight hours.' For this service the silver medal for gallantry was awarded to Coxswain/ Mechanic Arthur Liddon. The bronze medal was awarded to Second Coxswain/ Assistant Mechanic Anthony G.

Hawkins, who maintained a very high standard of navigation and communications in particularly bad weather conditions.

The thanks of the Institution inscribed on vellum were accorded to Second Assistant Mechanic Richard J.

Hawkins and Crew Members John J.

Smith and Gordon Davis. Letters of thanks from Captain Nigel Dixon, RN, the Director of the Institution, were sent to L. C. White, district officer of HM Coastguard Dover Straits, and the masters of the Townsend car ferries Free Enterprise VII and Free Enterprise VIII, Captain B. Robinson and Captain J. Davenport.

Western Division Night service for ILB WATCHET COASTGUARD informed the honorary secretary of Minehead ILB station at 2325 on Saturday, September 13, 1975, that a flashing light, thought to be an SOS signal from a vessel in distress, had been sighted off Hurtstone Point. The ILB, a 19' Zodiac with twin engines and equipped for night operations, was launched at 2335 with Christopher Rundle in command and Peter McGregor and Albert Hartgen as crew.

The wind was north east force 7, and the sea rough and confused. It was two hours to high water and the flood stream was setting eastwards at about 2 knots.

The night was dark with an overcast sky and driving rain reduced visibility to moderate.

The ILB headed westward towards Hurtstone Point at slow speed because of the rough sea which was aggravated by wind against tide. A message was received from the Watchet Coastguard mobile that the casualty, thought to be a white-hulled sailing yacht, was about 1J miles east of Hurtstone Point andhalf a mile off the land. In view of the weather conditions it was requested that situation reports be passed from the ILB every two minutes.

At 2359, when half a mile north of Minehead Bluff, an illuminating parachute flare was fired, but nothing was sighted. The ILB continued westward and at around 0005 a flashing light was sighted briefly about 30 degrees on the starboard bow some distance away.

Course was altered towards the light and the Coastguard was informed that the weather was deteriorating and progress towards the last known posiposition of the light was being made with difficulty. The honorary secretary instructed the ILB not to go west of Hurtstone Point and Barry Dock No. 1 lifeboat was placed on alert.

At about 0018 a beam of light was sighted right ahead some half-a-mile away. A second parachute flare was fired but failed to illuminate the casualty, and the ILB headed on towards the light. Eventually, at 0029, a whitehulled 37' sloop-rigged yacht without sails was sighted lying beam on to the sea, bows south east, and rolling heavily.

The wind was still blowing from the north east force 7, but the sea was becoming more confused, making it difficult to manoeuvre the ILB.

Helmsman Rundle took the ILB close down the port side of the yacht, Svea, and shouted to a person standing in the cockpit that the yacht was too large to be taken in tow; he advised that she be anchored and the crew would be taken off and landed at Minehead.

The ILB, having stood off while the yacht anchored and became tide-rode with bows west, manoeuvred, with difficulty, alongside her port side and managed to take off one man before having to stand off again. On the second attempt the remaining crew, a man and a woman, were taken off in a similar manner. All were safely on board the ILB by 0049.

Svea had sailed in from Lundy Island trying to find shelter, but had lost her sails and an anchor and had run out of fuel. In an effort to attract attention her crew had expended all their distress flares at dusk, and had only an electric torch with which to signal.

The ILB made her way slowly back to Minehead, where the survivors were landed at 0136 into the care of the honorary medical adviser, Dr P. Leech (also a crew member), and the boat was rehoused and ready for service by 0210 with the crew standing by for an overdue local fishing boat. Svea was recovered later by a Minehead boat.

For this service the thanks of the Institution inscribed on vellum were accorded to Helmsman Christopher J.

Rundle, and vellum service certificates were presented to Crew Members Peter S. McGregor and Albert J. Hartgen.

South Western Division Trawler taking water A FRENCH TRAWLER, Enfant de Bretagne, broadcast a Mayday call on the afternoon of Tuesday, December 2, 1975, saying that she was taking water in heavy weather in position 320°M 18 miles from St Ives Head. This information was given to the deputy launching authority of St Ives at 1502, and at 1520 the 37' Oakley lifeboat Jane Hay, on temporary duty at St Ives, was launched.

The tide was in the last hour of flood and the wind was north north west force 7 gusting to force 9. The lifeboat therefore encountered heavy seas on her starboard bow from the moment of leaving harbour as Coxswain Thomas Cocking, Senior, set course for the casualty.

After only about half an hour on course the lifeboat received information that Enfant de Bretagne had cancelled her Mayday because the leak had been stopped and she was now under the tow of another French trawler. Jane Hay was consequently recalled to station.

She had almost reached St Ives Head on the return passage when, at 1625, Enfant de Bretagne sent a further message reporting that her engine room was now flooding in very heavy seas. HM Coastguard suggested the lifeboat should return to the casualty and Coxswain Cocking immediately turned seawards again, this time setting course almost due west to allow for what he estimated must have been the progress of Enfant de Bretagne since her original Mayday.

From the description of the seas which her master had given, and from his own estimate of her probable speed made good southwards of about 5£ knots, Coxswain Cocking surmised, correctly as it subsequently proved, that the trawler was probably now approaching Cape Cornwall Bank.

Communications with Enfant de Bretagne were very poor because of her radio, and the Coastguard repeatedly tried unsuccessfully to obtain an updated position from the master. It appeared that such communication as could be established had to be via Land's End Radio.

At about 1700 Coxswain Cocking made another calculation of his own and altered course to 250°M to intercept the trawler. Twenty-five minutes later the Coastguard suggested this same course and the coxswain replied that he was already steering that course and that his ETA at the casualty was 1805. At 1740 Jane Hay's crew saw lights on the starboard bow and asked Land's End Radio to request Enfant de Bretagne to fire a flare to identify herself. The casualty never did comply with this request but, about five minutes later, the lifeboat saw the lights of a towing vessel and so realised that Enfant de Bretagne was the next vessel astern of her.

By 1820 Jane Hay had closed to within a few yards of the trawler's starboard side where she took up station and remained in very close escort in case the trawler should founder.

There was still no communication with the casualty but, despite the appalling weather conditions, the passage continued without further incident until the lee of Land's End was reached south of Runnel Stone Buoy. The Longships area had to be given a very wide berth to westward, as did Cam Base two miles southwards, because of the enormous seas.

The honorary secretary St Ives then asked Penlee lifeboat to launch and take over the escort back to Newlyn.

This was done and the rendezvous was made at about 1945 when four miles east south east of the Runnel Stone. St Ives lifeboat then handed over the escort to Penlee and set course for home.

The Inspector HM Coastguard South West Division had by this time gone to the Coastguard lookout at St Ives and reported that spray was in fact being blown across the lookout, which is some 70' above sea level. He became concernedfor the safety of the lifeboat on her return passage and asked HMS Tartar, which was in the vicinity, to remain in the area until St Ives lifeboat had returned to her station.

The return passage found the lifeboat bucking headwinds of a steady force 9 from due north as she passed Longships. Conditions gradually worsened and, by the time she was abreast of the Brisons, the seas were reaching 35 feet and breaking and, for the first time in his experience of this lifeboat, Coxswain Cocking found himself obliged to reduce speed. In spite of this, the seas off Cape Cornwall were sufficient to tear the bow fender from its fixing. St Ives Harbour was eventually regained by 2310 and, with some difficulty, the boat was recovered on to her carriage.

This had been a most arduous service, and Motor Mechanic John Hosking sitting at the radio had found himself on more than one occasion in water up to his waist after exceptional seas had broken over the quarter and filled the cockpit. They were the worst conditions Coxswain Cocking and his crew had ever experienced in the lifeboat, and for the coxswain this spans a period of 25 years. Of the eight hours at sea, the last six had been in darkness and heavy rain.

For this service the thanks of the Institution inscribed on vellum were accorded to Coxswain Thomas Cocking, Senior. Vellum service certificates were presented to Motor Mechanic John D.

Hosking, Assistant Mechanic William Benney and Crew Members David L.

Smith, John T. Lander and William H. Jenkyn.

Eastern Division Sea Rhine founders AT 0423 ON WEDNESDAY February 11, HM Coastguard informed the honorary secretary of Great Yarmouth and Gorleston lifeboat station that a Mayday call had been received from the coaster Sea Rhine whose cargo had shifted, causing her to list badly.

The 44' Waveney lifeboat Khami set out at 0439 in a strong breeze and a moderate sea. It was high water and visibility was good. She reached the coaster, whose position was some 20miles east south east of the lifeboat station, at 0620. A tug had already taken off the master of Sea Rhine and a seaman, but the mate had remained aboard. However, within minutes her list had increased sharply and the lifeboat went alongside on the port quarter and took the mate off. The other two survivors were then transferred from the tug to the lifeboat. At 0802 Sea Rhine sank and the lifeboat returned to her station arriving at 0915.

North Eastern Division Cut off by tide A LOCAL COBLE alerted Flamborough Coastguard on the afternoon ol Saturday, August 23, 1975; two people were cut off by the tide on the cliff at West Scar. After viewing the site and ruling out any attempt at rescue over the cliff as too dangerous, the Coastguard telephoned the honorary secretary of the lifeboat station at 1600, maroons were fired and the 35' 6" Liverpool lifeboat Friendly Forester launched at 1615.

It was two hours before high water, with wind north-easterly force 2, a slight sea and moderate swell.

The position of the trapped people was clearly visible from the launching site. They were on a ledge some 8 feet above the water. Both sides of North Landing have heavy outcrops of scar.

The swell, though moderate at the entrance to the cove, built itself up, becoming confused especially in the vicinity of the casualties.

Coxswain George Pockley had made up his mind before launching that any attempt to take the lifeboat to the casualties would seriously hazard his boat and crew and would prove unsuccessful.

He therefore anchored at the entrance to the cove and veered down cable. The rocket line was then fired to the Coastguard on the cliff top, who pulled in one veering line attached to the breeches buoy. Unfortunately the rocket line fouled and chaffed through before the veering line had been hauled to the land, but the gear was recovered, another line fired and the veering line hauled to the cliff top successfully.

With the gear rigged in this way the breeches buoy could be guided directly to the two people on the cliff. As one of them had an injured leg, and to avoid further delay, Coxswain Pockley instructed Crew Member Alwyn Emmerson to go ashore in the buoy to help. Such was the smooth, practised cooperation between lifeboat crew and Coastguard that Alwyn Emmerson was landed just below the casualties.

By this time the swell was reaching the base of the ledge and the resultant confused water made it very difficult for the casualties to get into the breeches buoy. While Alwyn Emmerson was helping the first person, Auxiliary Coastguard John Powell was lowered down the cliff to help, and both people continued on page 111.