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The Fraserburgh Inquiry

A FORMAL investigation under the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894 was held at the Sheriff Court House, Aberdeen, from 5th to 12th October, 1970, into the circumstances attending the capsizing of the Fraserburgh life-boat The Duchess of Kent with a loss of five lives on 21 st January. The Sheriff Principal, Mr. Frederick W. F. O'Brien, Q_.c., presided. He was assisted by three assessors, Mr. A. R. Elder, Professor J. F. C. Conn, D.SC., C.ENG., M.R.I.N.A., and Mr. L. A. Clegg, D.S.C., D.A.

The transcript of evidence ran to some 300 closely-typed foolscap pages, and the report of the court was a lengthy one. Within the space available it will therefore be possible to give no more than a fairly full summary. In examining the question of whether any blame for the disaster was to be attributed to any individual or organisation, the court made its findings clear.

In unequivocal terms it stated: 'The Duchess of Kent was well equipped and in a seaworthy condition when she sailed on her last mission. No vessel can be guaranteed to survive all possible sea conditions and this life-boat was unfortunate to encounter a very large wave which overwhelmed her. No blame for the disaster can be attributed to her coxswain and crew or to the R.N.L.I. The court emphasises that life-boat 10 rescue operations are, and will always be, extremely hazardous.' During the investigation the question was more than once raised of placing limits on the operational use of particular life-boats. On this point the court stated in its findings: 'The court has heard proposals that limits be placed on the use of 46 foot 9 inch Watson type lifeboats in such sea conditions as those in which the Duchess of Kent capsized. The court considers that it is impossible in practice to formulate such limitations, as there is an infinite variety of combinations of wind, sea and tide in any given locality. Decisions as to launching are best entrusted to the judgment of experienced seamen on the spot.' Among criticisms voiced was that of the possible effect on the life-boat when she had been refitted with new and more powerful engines. On this point it was stated: 'The court is satisfied that the re-engining and alterations had a minor and insignificant effect upon the vessel's stability and the disaster cannot in any way be attributed to effects arising from the re-engining, which did not impair the transverse stability and caused only a slight change in trim.'The court examined in great detail questions of communications and of the duties of H.M.

Coastguard in relation to the R.N.L.I. In this connection it stated that the evidence given pointed to the need for some type of central co-ordinating authority to collect and assess the available information and so determine the appropriate rescue service in the particular case.

The court did not consider it reasonable to assume that the life-boat coxswain was listening into the various radio telephone conversations concerning the vessel Opal.

In its report the court also stated: 'The Coastguard regulations provide for close co-operation between the Coastguard and the R.N.L.I. The local R.N.L.I, honorary secretary must be informed when a vessel is in distress in the vicinity and the regulations provide for communication with the life-boat through the shore stations. The life-boat is in communication with the local Coastguard station, which is responsible for maintaining contact with the honorary secretary. The Coastguards' duties in relation to the R.N.L.I, are advisory only. They pass on information and can make recommendations, but the executive decision as to launching remains the prerogative of the local honorary secretary.' It was made clear that the honorary secretary of the station, Captain J. Carter, was ill at the time of the disaster and that the acting honorary secretary was himself the life-boat coxswain.

The court recorded that the R.N.L.I, had taken steps 'to provide for any such contingency in the future'.

During the hearings much discussion took place on the subject of the design of life-boats and the suitability of particular boats for certain operational conditions. In this connection, particularly in view of a number of misleading statements which have been made, it is perhaps appropriate to quote in full the relevant part of the court's findings. These were: 'Founded in 1824, the R.N.L.I. has a long and honourable record of saving life at sea.

Furthermore, it has accumulated a wealth of experience in the design, construction, maintenance and operation of life-boats. During comparatively recent years new means of rendering aid to yachts, fishing craft and ships have become available. For example, aircraft can drop inflatable rubber life-rafts and helicopters can winch up survivors if weather conditions permit.

'Life-boats, however, must be available for rescue in inshore waters and at some considerable distance from shore. The R.N.L.I. already has in service new types of high-speed craft for inshore work, but it appears to the Court that too much is expected of the majority of life- boats. Most of those now in service are designed for work both close inshore and further afield.

Their shallow draught entails tunnel screws and the corresponding hull forms have comparatively poor resistance and propulsion qualities.

'Even in the case of restricted draught vessels, less resistful hulls could be designed and propelled by screws in nozzles (hence protected against beaching damage). For what may be termed deep sea work, craft of greater size and displacement are desirable if life-boats are to survive the frequent, severe North Sea storm conditions. Authoritative evidence was given of waves of 60 foot height accurately measured not far from the locality where the Duchess of Kent was capsized. In the district around Peterhead one such large life-boat could be available for distant work, with smaller boats for inshore rescues.' 'The court was informed that the R.N.L.I.

policy was to build all future craft of the selfrighting type. The court has not sufficient information at its disposal to comment on this policy but it suggests that with the present advances in knowledge of sea states and the research facilities available, the properties of comparable self-righting and other types of lifeboat are suitable subjects for research.

'Much expert knowledge, experience and research facilities are available in Government establishments, notably the National Physical Laboratory, the Admiralty Experiment Works at Haslar and the Board of Trade. The R.N.L.I.

might with advantage co-operate with such bodies on technical problems.' Finally the court recorded its appreciation of the strenuous efforts made by the Russian ships in life-saving and salvage of the life-boat and tendered its sympathy and condolences to the relatives of the men who gave their lives so unselfishly and courageously.

As the whole matter was still sub judice when the last number of THE LIFE-BOAT was published no account of the circumstances of the disaster could be given. A full report taken verbatim from the annex of the report therefore appears on page 47.

Three days after the report of the court was published a special meeting of the executive committee of the R.N.L.I.'s Committee of Management was held under the chairmanship of Admiral Sir Wilfrid Woods. This gave an opportunity for an immediate examination of the court's findings and for a discussion on what the R.N.L.I. itself should do in the light of the findings. A number of special investigations were decided upon by the committee. These included: (i) re-examination of the existing proposals for modifying Watson life-boats of the 46 foot 9 inch midship steering and 47(ii) (iii) foot classes to see if they can be accelerated and improved; the examination of the present deployment of 70 foot boats and the cost and time required for constructing new boats of this class; whether the R. N.L.I, should make any recommendations to the authorities concerned for improving communications with life-boats at sea; whether there is a need to modify future construction proposals; what would be the financial implications of adopting any or all of the recommendations resulting from the above studies.

In announcing these decisions the committee welcomed the finding of the court that no blame for the loss of the Fraserburgh crew could be attributed to the coxswain, the crew or the R.N.L.I. It also stated that, notwithstanding the conclusions of the recent Board of Trade report on the marine search and rescue organisation, an improvement in co-ordination of rescue services could be made, and added that the R.N.L.I, would be prepared to take urgent steps to examine this matter in conjunction with the other authorities concerned..