" WHAT is the Naval Reserve?" This is a question which was very frequently asked during the early part of the month of May of the present year; and, certainly, until the daily papers undertook the task of en- lightenment, the country generally was either profoundly unconscious of the exist- ence of that force, or entertained views not a little hazy and undecided, concerning both its constitution and national importance; while even now public opinion on the subject is plentifully diluted with ignorance and indifference. But this popular indif- ference and ignorance must not be taken as a measure of the important bearing of the matter on the future of our great Maritime Empire. It is indeed most fortunate that we have secured a reserve, such as it is, for the Navy, before being awakened by a sudden war to inquire into what we had, and to dis- cover, somewhat painfully, what we wanted.

Because man naturally attaches more importance to that which is continually brought under his notice corporeally, as well as mentally, than to things which he only hears of in a far-off and unrealizable manner, it is constantly resulting that, while all subjects connected with the profession of arms on shore occupy a considerable portion of public attention, and frequently elicit strong and unmistakable expressions of public opinion; yet, that matters connected with the profession of arms at sea are treated with comparative indifference, and that on such topics it is next to impossible to excite the attention of the country suf- ficiently to cause it to express any opinion on them. It is in this way alone that we can account for the fact that whereas the average number of able seamen required for war purposes is at least 60,000, while the actual number voted by Parliament has been under 20,000, there has yet existed no public alarm, and no popular voice of disapproval that there should be no means of supplying the deficiency. We say " no means of supplying the deficiency," because, so far as the knowledge of the general public went, the Royal Naval Re- serve can hardly be said to have had any existence. Many of those whose duties brought them into contact with the force, blinded by prejudice and professional anti- pathies, pronounced it wholly unreliable and unimportant; and some of those who thought most deeply and earnestly on the subject considered that, in point of numbers and organization, it was insuf- ficient to meet the requirements of the nation in time of war. In point of fact, it was not that Naval Reserve which so great a commercial and maritime state as ours ought to maintain. Now, while agree- ing most cordially with this last opinion, we have always entertained the highest opinion of the professional skill and good character of the Naval Reserve men themselves, and have held that they were not receiving their proper share of public attention, or that in them existed the nucleus of a formidable and important power in the state. And now at last the representatives of this band of 16,000 skilful and well-trained merchant seamen have come before the world in such a manner as to show, to friends and foes alike, the good stuff they are made of, and to enforce some portion of the attention they are entitled to; and although those men who embarked in the reserve squadron in May were indeed but a small contingent of the force actually enrolled, and although the entire force is still short of the number re- commended and originally intended to be enrolled, yet we have in this " Reserve Navy," insufficient though it may be in point of numbers, a pledge of public spirit on the part of ship-owners and the merchant ser- vice on one hand, and an expression of ap- preciation of their services by the Crown, on the other hand, which is of the highest importance, not only now, but also in the planning and arrangement of that larger and better Naval Reserve which, as we hope, is yet to be.

One of the first questions that presents itself in considering this subject is, " What number of' able seamen' trained to arms do we require in the case of a great war with a maritime state ?" This number we place at 60,000 : and we are convinced we do not overstate it. For when it is reflected that our merchant ships are scattered all over the world—that the sea, from pole to pole, bears on its surface this country's wealth ; and that this wealth is necessary to our national greatness; and that even the tem- porary command of the sea would inflict an almost ruinous loss; whilst there is no security for our commerce unless it is guarded well, and everywhere by ships of war—it seems almost impossible that the work required could be done by the number we have named, even though that back- bone of able seamen were supplemented by the remaining five-sixths of a war ship's crew, for which our present reserve system makes no provision. But when we add to these reflections the considerations suggested by a rapid glance over the map of the world —when we realize, however faintly, the extent and wealth of our divided empire and scattered colonies, and remember how tre- mendous are the interests involved in the question of our ability to keep an uninter- rupted chain of communication between our dependencies and ourselves, one involuntarily quails at the prospect of what there is for our navy to do on the outbreak of a war with a great naval power, and how wholly insufficient are its present numbers and apparent resources.

But it has been decided—and the de- cision has apparently received the approval of the country—that there is to be no longer a gigantic navy in time of peace, and the disposition is rather to decrease the number of fighting men than to increase them, and therefore there remains but one possible prevention of great national calamity, and there remains but one way to prevent the destruction of our commerce, the loss of many of our colonies, and great national humiliation immediately following on the declaration of war : that way is to train the whole of our mercantile marine to the use of arms, and to enrol every British-born merchant officer and sailor in a Reserve Navy; to select again from that whole body all the effective portion who are willing and desirous of serving as warriors, on certain conditions and on important occasions, as is the case with our present small reserve force, and to make these the permanent or " Royal Reserve " but a reserve embracing every rank, and thoroughly organized. When this is done—and it is certain that it may be done—every British merchant ship will be a source of strength instead of weak- ness, and the ocean,—now teeming with floating storehouses of the national food, the national manufactures, the national wealth, all unprepared and defenceless, each one a source of anxiety in times of trouble, and a certain loss in time of war,—will become a highway thronged with evidences of British power, and each ship will be a source of satisfaction at all times, and of positive strength in the hour of need.

The Royal Naval Reserve is a step in the right direction, but it is a step only. Ten years ago this force was called into existence, and for ten years it has staggered on under the blight of public indifference, the some- what cold welcome of the Royal Navy, and some not infrequent misdirection on the part of the governing powers; nevertheless, the thing has gone steadily forward, as indeed it could not fail to do, seeing that it is based on sound principles; and now the First Lord himself comes forward, and while awakening to life the almost dormant force of this hitherto unused body of public servants, while practically displaying the utility of the idea, and giving an immense spur to the whole system, he has convinced every one else, if not himself, that there is still very much wanting in the plan and development of our maritime reserves. It is clear that the four to six thousand of able seamen whom we could now count on as within reach, in case of a sudden war, would not meet the exigencies of such a crisis.

What we really do want is a Reserve based on such principles as to include eventually, in some way or other, all the mercantile marine, coasting vessels as well as foreign going; and to induce such a spirit of emu- lation that the great ports should vie in their efforts to make it efficient; and every great trading harbour should be able to man, for their annual cruise, one or more ships, officered and manned entirely from the Keserve; while the calling out of all the Naval Reserve at home would mean the as- sembling of twenty or thirty of Her Majesty's ships, who, except that they would be under admirals and commodores especially ap- pointed, would be entirely in the hands of that body, and each Reserve-manned ship would be as complete in itself, without the partial manning of her from the regular Navy, as a volunteer regiment is complete, though it has not a " regular " in its ranks.

Bat it will be said, " We don't want the whole of the merchant-service men turned into warriors, for then who is to carry on the commerce of the country in time of war?" We reply that the merchant-service sailor will do his duty as such, both in peace and war, all the more efficiently because he has been trained to arms, and knows something of discipline. And, moreover, every trader manned by such men, and having on board, as is the case even now with some of our ships, certain implements of warfare, would not only be safer from capture by the enemy's light cruisers and privateers, but, inasmuch as this training would tend to raise—and that very greatly—the whole tone and morale of the men, she would be infinitely safer from shipwreck and loss. An enemy's cruisers, too, would then have to be of good size and well armed, if they would inju- riously affect our commerce; whereas nqw our largest and finest ships would be the certain prey of the tiniest cock-boat of a pri- vateer which might put to sea with a crew of 30 men and a rifled gun on her forecastle.

But while the merchant-service so con- stituted would contribute enormously to the security of commerce and the stability of merchants, it would be also a source of strength to the country; for not only would it leave the Royal Navy compara- tively free at the outbreak of a war to concentrate all their force on an enemy's fleets, or on his home defences, but inas- much as there would always be at least 20,000 Reserve men in the United King- dom at one time, it would place at the disposal of the Crown, for temporary purposes, a second or reserve fleet, which ! would be sufficient in itself to hold its own in British waters until the regular navy had time to increase the number of its seamen by voluntary entries; or may be till it had recovered from some heavy blow, or hard-fought battle. And again, at the commencement of a war, it would augment the Royal Navy's numbers considerably; and augment them no longer with the worst specimens of the merchant service, who had everything to learn, and many bad habits to forget, as has been the case in times past; but with fine seamen, who had been pre- viously well trained while in the Reserve.

For at such a time there would always be an immense number of sailors thrown out of employ by the cessation of certain lines of trade or other causes, and many of these, fired by the love of glory, stimulated with hope of prize money, or animated by pure patriotism, would hurry to range themselves under the pennants of the Royal ships, which thus, no longer dependent on the miserable wretches whom extravagant bounties have on such occasions often provided for the national defences, would be manned by the skilful and trained seamen who, edu- cated in the Naval Reserve, were able and willing to take their places beside the best men that the regular Navy could pro- duce. And it must be remembered, also, that one of the great difficulties in the way of such a desirable consummation is fast dis- appearing in the decrease of the jealousies and dislikes of the two navies for each other.

The last ten years has done much to smooth away these ancient misunderstandings, for the existence of the Naval Reserve was a powerful agent of conciliation; but it is clear that the ten days' cruise off the Land's End, under Admirals KEY and HORNBY, and in the immediate presence of the Lords of the Admiralty, in which officers and seamen of the merchant service worked, commanded, and obeyed side by side with their brethren of the regular Navy, did more in this direction than the previous ten years of drill in batteries or guardships had either done, or could be expected to do.

We have spoken throughout this paper of "able seamen," for of this class the Royal Naval Reserve is exclusively com- posed. Now, one of the first difficulties which the reformer who legislates on this subject will be met with is,—that as the whole number of British merchant seamen at present employed in British merchant ships is under 60,000, it may be presumed that, in the Reserve of 16,000, we have pro- JULY 1,1869.] THE LIFE-BOAT.bably already got all the able seamen worth having; moreover, this number is yearly decreasing in an increasing ratio. In truth, after the repeal of the navigation laws, and the consequent cessation on the part of owners to educate boys for the sailor's life, this result was certain to happen. The Royal Navy for some years partially supplied the deficiency, by a constant process of training up boys, whom it forced out of its employ when they had attained manhood, either because the Government of the day broke faith with them, or because they disliked the interminable drill, or the over-severity of the system, and the great mass of such men became absorbed in the merchant ser- vice. But things are wonderfully changed now; successive Admiralties, for many years, have scrupulously kept faith with Jack, and Jack trusts the Admiralty ac- j cordingly ; while ali useless drills have been abolished, and unnecessary severities discarded; so that the merchant service is no longer recruited from the Royal j Navy. Again shipowners, for some years, i were, so to speak, trading on the stock ] provided by the wise legislation of a pre-vious age ; but that could not last for ever, seeing that all old sailors must die at last, and no steps were taken to provide a fresh supply. Thus it is evident that before we can complete our " Reserve " of able seamen, we must enact laws compelling owners to educate boys for the sea life, and j we must enlarge and extend our system of! training ships for the mercantile marine.

Tie next thing a reforming legislator would have to consider is, whether, in pro- viding for the able seamen only, we are not attaching too little importance to the other component parts of a war-ship's crew. The theory is, that having made sure of the backbone of the ship's company by. this reserve of able seamen, we can afford to leave the rest to chance. That is to say, we have provided for 100 men and about an officer and a half for each ship, whose entire complement is 600, but the remaining 500 we make no provision for; and as this 500 includes engineers, stokers, ordinary seamen, boys, and the bulk of the officers, it must be confessed that the omission is a somewhat important one in the organization of our reserve.

And lastly, he would have to ascertain the best method of securing the co-opera- tion of shipowners and of the officers and men in the merchant-service; to consider the best means to be employed for placing before them the truth, that the Naval Reserve is a direct gain to them, and that the whole subject is intimately involved with their best interests. Heretofore it has been allowed to assume a character intensely impregnated with £ s. d. It has become degraded to a simple question of " For so much rnoney will you endure so many days' drill ?" Little or no attempt to call into play pride of class, pride of native port, in- dividual liking for chosen leaders, or to produce in any sort esprit du corps has ever been made; and thus a most powerful agency in dealing with masses of men has been neglected. If, for instance, at the beginning of the volunteer movement, the government had said, " very well, my good men; you want to learn soldiering; you may proceed to the nearest military station, and we will give instructions that you shall be duly drilled in the barrack; square." If the government had so acted, we should have heard little more of the British volun- teer; and though in the case of the blue jacket, money does necessarily enter more largely into the question, yet it was, and is a blunder to allow it to be the sole conside- ration. The infinitely more important pro- blem is, how to make the Naval Reserve the pride and glory of the merchant-service, and how to make the great shipowners, leading commanders, and thriving sea-ports vie with each other in their endeavours to have always ready for the service of the state the greatest number of good sailors trained to arms. This is the vital question; and the statesman who shall give it a practical solu- tion will have done more for his country than if he had covered her coasts with, fortresses, or presented the state with a fleet of the finest war-ships : for of the former, we have already more than our troops could defend ; and of the latter, many more than our navy could possibly man.

We have, in the foregoing pages, dimly indicated the kind of Reserve which we believe this country needs, and which, we believe, future necessities may yet create for us; let us hope at least that when the storm bursts on us, we may have progressed some- what more in the right direction than our present crude apology for a Reserve would lead us to expect. In the meantime, how- ever, we have in our existing Royal Naval Reserve between 16,000 and 17,000 of the finest seamen in the world, and we have attached to them a certain infinitely small number of officers, fine sailors also, skilful navigators, and gentlemen to boot. The defect in the seamen is, a certain unreadi- ness for, and distaste to work, for pure work's sake, which shows itself in an almost involuntary shrinking from any duty he is not actually compelled to perform—involun- tary, as though the result of long habit, and perhaps half unknown to himself, but be- traying a disposition very distasteful to, and scarcely understandable by a regular man-of- war's man. The defect in the officer, re- sulting from no fault of his own, but from the fact that all his training hitherto has given him no insight into fleet sailing, squadron manoeuvres, and all the thousand and one specialities of an officer's duties in the Royal Navy; and, therefore, his educa- tion is terribly backward in comparison with the men whom he leads. It was very possible to transform a good merchant sea- man into a good fighting seaman, by train- ing him to arms in the batteries of guard- ships or outlying ports; but it was wholly impossible to make a merchant-service officer a good commander, lieutenant, or sub-lieu- tenant, by any such process, and, therefore, his preparatory training for war service should have been conducted on totally dif- ferent principles. We believe that the readiest and only way at present to instruct the officer is to attach him temporarily to sea-going men-of-war in the same manner that is customary with the officers of foreign navies who come to us for instruction, though of course the Reserve officer could only be there a short time consecutively.

These are the apparent defects in the men of whom our Reserve is composed: nevertheless, with all their faults, the country has just cause of pride in them, for they are undoubtedly a magnificent body of the best kind of seamen in the world, whose faults are the result of education and defec- tive system, whose virtues are all their own, and whose ambition and hope we believe to be to deserve well of their Sovereign and their Country.—Portsmouth, 16 June, 1869.

[If any apology be needed for bringing before our readers a subject the connection of which with the " preservation of life from shipwreck" is not immediately ap- parent, we would observe that we think anything tending to the improved education, discipline, and morale of the seamen in the merchant-service is an indirect means for the prevention of marine disasters with con- sequent loss of life.

Again, the Royal Naval Reserve are ever ready to man the life-boats of the NATIONAL LIFE-BOAT [INSTITUTION, and have on several occasions distinguished themselves in that service. It should also be stated that many of them, when overtaken by shipwreck on our coasts, have been saved by the life-boats of the Institution, some on more than one occasion, as] we have heard them gratefully acknowledge.