SCARCELY had the British public had time to fully realize the national loss by the wreck of H.M.S. Orpheus, as narrated in the foregoing pages—scarcely were they made aware that a splendid man-of-war steamer, with her perfect equipment, and so large a portion of her brave officers and crew, were lost to their country and friends—when their feelings were again shocked by the intelligence of the total destruction of the first-class mail and passenger steamer Anglo-Saxon, "with no less than 237 of those on board her.

This unfortunate vessel, belonging to the " Canadian Royal Mail Steam Company," is said to be no less than the sixth lost by the same Company during the last few years, viz., the Canadian (No. 1) in 1857, the Indian in 1859, the Hungarian in 1800, the North Britain and Canadian (No. 2) in 1861, and the Anglo-Saxon in 1863.

What have been the causes of so continued a run of misfortune attending the ships of one managing body ? The question concerns not only the shareholders in the company and its managing directors, and the relatives and friends of the unfortunate persons who, placing their faith in the security of the means provided to convey them to their several destinations, yet perished ere they reached them. It concerns us all, for as it is a national duty to provide for the protection of human life, the national character is at stake. Has it been that, owing to the prevalence of fogs and icebergs, or irregular set of the tides oil the North American shores, those vessels are peculiarly liable to danger? Has it been that, carrying the mails, they are bound by contract to deliver them within as short a time as possible, and that a high speed throughout their voyages has been necessary to enable them to do so ? Or has it been that the captains of these ships, having that natural pride in them which every good officer feels in his ship, have been actuated by a desire to make quicker passages than rival vessels? Or, again, have these successive disasters been occasioned by neglect or carelessness or other fault on the part of the managing body of the company? These and other analogous questions will probably have presented themselves—and not unnaturally so —to many on hearing of the wreck of the Anglo-Saxon.

Whatever may have been the causes in the former cases, it does not appear that in this case any blame can be attached to the owners of the ship for her loss; since, as will be seen by the letter from them, with an extract from their instructions to the captain, which we give below, they especially urged him to run no risk whatever of the vessel, but rather to lose one or two days on the passage.

The immediate occasion of the disaster seems to have been that, from some cause or another, the ship was seventeen miles out of the position she was supposed to be in at the time when she struck; but what that cause was there is no evidence to show.

The following is the account given by the " first officer," which conveys a fair idea of the whole circumstances of the case :— " St. John's, Newfoundland, " Wednesday, April 29.

" The Anglo-Saxon left Liverpool on the 16th instant, at 5 P.M. She experienced strong westerly gales until Saturday, the 25th, at 8 P.M., when she fell in with ice and a thick fog. The engines were immediately slowed. At 10 P.M., the ice being so thick and heavy, the engines were stopped altogether, a light breeze from the south forcing the ship ahead about one knot an hour. At 5 I'.M. on the 26th the fog lifted, and, the ice having slacked, we set the foretop sails and head sails, moving the engines occasionally at a dead slow. At half-past 10 A.M. the fog cleared away altogether, and we saw clear water to the west-north-west from the masthead. We continued our course toward clear water. At 2 P.M. we got the ship clear of ice, and steered north-west-by-west with full speed, and with all possible sail. A moderate breeze was blowing from the southward at this time — at noon, lat. 46° 57', long. 57° 2V by the chronometer.

At 10 P.M. the breeze freshened, and blew strongly from the south-south-east, and a dense fog set in.

We took in all sail at 8 A M. on the 27th. The fog still continued to be dense, and, supposing the ship to be 40 miles off Cape Race, we altered her course to the west, half-north, and slowed the engines to half speed, which we supposed would have taken us 17 miles south of Cape Race. At ten minutes past 11 A.M. breakers were reported on the starboard beam. Captain BURGESS immediately ordered the engines to be reversed at full speed; but before her headway could be stopped she struck fiat on the rocks of Clatn Cove, about four miles north of Cape Race. A heavy sea rolling in drove her quarter on the rocks, carrying away her rudder, sternpost, and propeller. Finding that there was no possibility of the ship coming off, the order was given to let go both anchors, to hold the ship on the rocks. The carpenter was forthwith sent to examine the fore peak, and found it filling fast with water. He also examined the fore hatch, but found no water there. The chief engineer coming up immediately afterward reported the forward stockhole filling fast. He opened the valves and blew the steam out of the boilers. The boats were all immediately lowered successfully, except No. 1 and No. 3. The ship was so close on the rocks that these could not be got out. Boat No. 2, with some of the crew and passengers, commanded by Captain CBAWFORD, was sent to find a place to land the passengers. Some of the crew being landed on the rocks by means of the studdingsail- boom, with the help of some of the passengers, got a hawser secured to a rock to keep the vessel from listing out. We then commenced to land the female passengers on the rocks by means of the foreyard arm. The first-class passengers were put into a boat. At about noon the ship's stern swung off from the rocks, and she settled down very fast, listing to port at the same time, and sunk in deep water. The captain and a great many passengers were on deck at the time, and with a part of the crew, all were lost." Whilst, however, we acquit the owners of this vessel, and the captain also, of sacrificing in this instance safety to speed, we cannot but fear that the general impulse to " save time," which is a leading characteristic of the age, arid which pervades not alone the masters and passengers in steam-ships, but all classes of travellers, has tended greatly to diminish the caution and carefulness with which commanders were wont to approach the vicinity of land in the good old days of sailing-ships.

If we extend our inquiry to the twenty years that the mail steam-packet service has been in existence, we learn that about thirty of such packets have been wrecked during that period in the North Atlantic Ocean alone, and that in them upwards of 2,000 persons have perished, and 3,000,000?.

worth of property has been destroyed.

It is, no doubt, true, as in the case of railways, that if we take into consideration the vastly increased number of passengers whom the exigencies of the times, or business, or pleasure, together with increased facility, and comfort, and speed of conveyance tempt abroad, the proportion of lives lost to the number of those carried may be much less than in former times; yet that result ought not to satisfy us. We profess to be a highly civilized as well as a Christian nation, and there can be no higher test of civilization and Christianity than the value set on human life. As we regard, then, our national credit, and as we would wish for the blessing of God on our nation, we surely ought to be satisfied with nothing less than that every possible precaution should be taken, and every available means of safety be adopted to reduce to a minimum the loss of life on the sea in British ships. We trust, therefore, that the Government may be stirred up by these two late terrible disasters to seriously consider the question, whether our men-of-war and merchant vessels, and more especially our passenger-ships, are provided with every practicable Means to diminish the loss of life on the recurrence of such calamities in future.

In one respect the Anglo-Saxon appears to us to have been very imperfectly equipped.

As stated in the evidence of one of her officers, she had only six boats, being one boat only to each 74 persons on board her.

We consider that a vessel of her size might have carried twice that number of boats, and in addition have been provided with the material, specially prepared, for putting together a raft of sufficient size to carry a large number of persons.

We have formerly, in this Journal, urged that every boat in a passenger-vessel should be a life-boat—not a sham life-boat, but a real one—a boat which, if stove in or half filled by a sea, with its full complement of passengers on board, should still float light enough to be manageable—boats which, if stowed in board and prevented from being hoisted out, would yet float on the ship sinking beneath them, instead of being drawn down with her—boats which, if upset in hoisting out or lowering into the water, might easily be righted again by three or four men in the water, if provided with lifebelts themselves.

The London Company for Building Boats by Machinery have been invited to construct such boats, and to place them before the Government authorities and the shipping community, and they will probably be shortly prepared. They will very likely be somewhat more expensive than the generality of the so-called ships' life-boats at present in use; but if every passenger-ship should be compelled to carry them, the increased expense need not be felt by the shipowner.

An insignificant charge to every passenger, for life-boats provided for their safety spread over the number of years that a boat would last, would suffice to more than repay the owner for his original outlay; and we feel sure that the instances would be very rare indeed when passengers would be stupid and mean enough to grudge the payment of such a trifling forced insurance on their own lives.

The following letter has been addressed to Mr. THOMAS COURT, secretary to the Association of Underwriters at Liverpool, by the owners of the ill-fated ship :— " Liverpool, May 13.

" Dear Sir—In reply to your inquiry relative to the report in this day's papers that the Anglo- Saxon was ordered to call at Cape Race, we beg to give you the following explanation:—Having received information from Canada shortly before her sailing to the effect that the ice in the St.

Lawrence was likely to be rather late in breaking up, we deemed it prudent, although the direct sailings were not commenced this year any earlier than usual, to have full information as to the state of the ice, waiting for Captain BURGESS at the various telegraphic stations between Cape Race and Quebec, so that he might learn whether it was safer to proceed to Quebec or to steer for Portland, and we have since heard that such information was sent down by our agents in Canada.

Cape Race being the nearest station, and being in the direct track for the St. Lawrence, Captain BURGESS was informed that if he found no ice in the way, and could approach the Cape without running any risk, it would be desirable to do so; but if he could not safely do so he should proceed to some other station on the route to receive information.

An erroneous idea haying apparently entered the public mind that owners of steamers in general order their captains to endeavour to make rapid passages, at all hazards, we can safely assert that such is quite contrary to fact. Enclosed you will find for your perusal an extract from the original instructions given to Captain BURGESS on his appointment as commander, which are similar to those given to all our captains, from which you will observe that the utmost care and caution are impressed upon them, and that they are specially directed rather to be a day or two longer on the voyage than run any risk whatever to make a speedy passage. These cautions are renewed every trip, and the last words spoken to Captain BURGESS before sailing were to the effect that the safety of the ship was the first thing to be attended to.

" We are, &c., "AttAN BROTHERS AND Co.

" THOMAS COURT, Esq." In the instructions alluded to, among other stringent rules, appear the following: — " When you meet with fog or ice, or when, owing to the darkness or the weather, there is any risk in proceeding, the safest course is to lie-to till daylight or until the weather clears up. The lead should be used frequently, and the utmost care exercised when you are in any doubt as to your position.

" It is, of course, satisfactory to us when quick and safe passages are made, but you will bear in mind that it is of far more importance to make a safe voyage, even although it should take a day or two more to do it, rather than to run any risk whatever to make a speedy passage."